Background. According to decision by sampling theory, people store relative frequencies of events in memory, and these values constitute subjective representations of events. Because fear is a natural response to the threat of death, we hypothesized that case fatality rate (CFR) statistics, which represent how deadly a disease is, would be positively correlated with self-reported fear ratings of neoplasms and circulatory diseases. Methods. Participants (N = 239) were asked to rate various neoplasms and circulatory diseases (110 diseases in total) on fear, typicality, and disgust scales (e.g., 1 = no fear, 10 = intense fear). They also estimated mortality and morbidity rates for the same set of diseases. Finally, they completed the Berlin Numeracy Test. CFRs were obtained from the World Health Organization (WHO) database. The association between relative CFR and fear ratings was tested using correlation analyses and a multilevel linear model with Bayesian inference techniques. Results. We found that fear ratings were related to relative CFRs (r = 0.42, [0.25, 0.56], BF = 3511). This effect was present on aggregate and, to some extent, on individual levels, even after controlling for other ratings, morbidity rate, participants' estimates of mortality and morbidity statistics, numeracy, sex, age, and knowledge of WHO statistics. Also, women rated neoplasms as more frightening than circulatory diseases, and typicality ratings were related to morbidity rates. Limitations. Limited number of diagnostic entities and categories, lack of control over the technicality of disease names and participants' experience of diseases, and study sample (83% young women). Conclusions. We present initial evidence that implicit acquisition of CFRs of diseases through everyday experience may be related to the intensity of fear reactions to them.
ratings of fear. Here, we consider this possibility by examining relationships between subjective fear ratings and objective statistics regarding morbidity rate (MR) and case fatality rate (CFR).
Sampling Information from the Environment
In 2012, the 2 main causes of death in Poland were circulatory diseases and neoplasms, constituting 46% and 26% of all deaths, respectively. 4, 5 In the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10), 6 these 2 categories consist of 165 diagnostic entities, of which almost all can result in death. Since the emotion of fear is strongly related to death, 7, 8 fearfulness ratings for specific diseases should be associated with the frequency of their fatality. Although it is highly unlikely that one person could experience a representative sample of diseases, the notion that people store frequencies of events in memory has strong empirical support. [9] [10] [11] According to the decision by sampling theory, 3, 12 the subjective value of any attribute (e.g., prices in a market, credit in a bank account, or the probability of dying) is given by its relative rank in a sample of all similar attributes. In the case of probabilities, the theory assumes that people do not encode raw frequencies of events but develop mental distributions of events consisting of relative probabilities given by r p e ð Þ= 1 n À 1 ð Þ
where p e is the probability of event e (e.g., death from lung cancer), n is the number of events in the sample of events that e belongs to (e.g., the number of all diseases considered), and q is a vector of probabilities of all other events from the sample with length n-1 (e.g., the probabilities of dying from other diseases). To illustrate, the theory posits that the subjective value of lung cancer is determined by a series of binary, ordinal comparisons between the information available about lung cancer (e.g., the number of deaths out of all known cases) and other diseases. The information can be retrieved from the current context and/or long-term memory. The proportion of comparisons that result in the judgment ''lung cancer is more deadly'' constitutes the subjective value of lung cancer (i.e., relative rank). In the case of probabilities of death, relative rank can be substituted with relative probability using Eq. (1) . Sampling and the processing of frequencies play an important role in decision making under uncertainty and in communicating information about probabilities. For example, it has been demonstrated that an experiencebased format of information presentation (e.g., freely sampling a distribution of outcomes to learn that $100 could be won in 2 out of 100 samples) systematically differs from decisions from description (i.e., when information about outcomes and probabilities is explicitly provided; a 2% probability of winning $100), [13] [14] [15] because in the former condition, people behave as if a rare event had less impact on choices than in the latter situation. Interestingly, different factors such as affect, 16 numeracy, 17 and regulated sampling 18 have been shown to increase the sample sizes drawn in a decisions from experience task, which is likely to be of particular importance for the communication of risks and probabilities.
Hogarth and Soyer 19 claimed that the experiencebased format of information presentation mimics naturally occurring learning from experience. As a consequence, the format facilitates judgments and decisions based on natural frequencies instead of rarely accessible probabilities (see Hoffrage et al. 20 for a discussion on a distinction between natural and other types of frequencies). Indeed, these authors demonstrated that presenting information in the experience-based format improved accuracy in a series of probabilistic inference tasks. 19 In addition, the format seems to improve the understanding of conditional probabilities in the medical domain. 21 In summary, empirical evidence suggests that a frequency format for information acquisition is natural for humans and facilitates inferences.
Frequency Judgments
What psychological mechanism permits inferences about how deadly a disease is? Although in most everyday decision problems people do not have explicit access to exact frequencies, they may employ various heuristics: simple rules that reduce uncertainty or ambiguity of complex judgment and decision problems and substitute them with simpler ones. 22, 23 For example, availability heuristic enables important judgments about frequencies and probabilities to be made based on the ease with which relevant instances of cases are mentally constructed or retrieved from memory. 24 To illustrate, if cases of lung cancer are retrieved more easily than cases of breast cancer, then the frequency of the former is likely to be assessed as higher, without access to the actual statistics.
When dreadful consequences of different events become more vivid and available, they are likely to elicit negative emotions. 25, 26 For example, Gigerenzer 27 documented that after the September 11th terrorist attacks, many people started to avoid air travel, which eventually resulted in increased road traffic fatalities. A subsequent analysis of this effect 28 revealed that living closer to New York City predicted the increase in miles driven by car, which in turn predicted fatal traffic accidents. Importantly, the authors proposed that proximity to New York City could have evoked more fearful reactions to the risk of a terrorist attack. The above considerations make it plausible to suggest that with no direct and explicit access to statistics regarding dreadful risks (e.g., air catastrophes or cancer), people may make judgments based on natural frequencies, transforming an abstract concept (i.e., probability) into a more easily comprehendible and concrete one (i.e., availability). In the same vein, feelings and emotions can serve as cues informing people how to behave in different situations. 29 Here, we hypothesize that because of its functional importance developed through evolution, fear is likely to be associated with representations of frequencies of threatening events, such as CFRs of fatal diseases.
Fear as an Indicator of Threat
Fear is one of the basic emotions among humans and other primates. 30 It informs an organism about, and prepares responses to, a potential threat in the environment. 31 Even if threats like those that originally elicited fear reactions in organisms are uncommon in the modern world (e.g., natural predators rarely attack a person on the way to buy food at a local shop), the neural mechanisms responsible for generating and expressing fear responses remain, 2 and fear can still signal other dangers that are of great importance from a survival perspective (e.g., crossing the road on a red light, visiting dangerous areas in a city during the night, winter hiking in high mountains). Note that the prevalence of a disease (i.e., MR) does not necessarily indicate how deadly the disease is, but the probability of death given the disease (i.e., CFR) is such an indicator. Thus, fear reactions should be related to relative objective CFRs.
Overview of the Study and Hypotheses
We propose that ratings of fear for ICD-10 6 diagnostic entities regarding neoplasms and circulatory diseases would be positively correlated with their relative CFRs. Assuming that the threat of death elicits strong fearful reactions, and people have access to relative frequencies of death regarding various diseases, a greater threat (i.e., a higher CFR) should cause stronger fear. This relationship should be evident and much stronger at a group level than at an individual level, as it is highly unlikely that one person would experience a representative sample of deaths caused by various diseases. We test our prediction while controlling for possible confounding variables: relative MR, disease category, length of disease name, subjective ratings of typicality (i.e., how typical a given disease is of its category), and disgust. In addition, because people may have simply mapped their fear ratings onto subjective CFR and MR estimates, participants were also asked to estimate these values. We also controlled for potentially confounding variables such as familiarity with the World Health Organization (WHO) statistics and statistical numeracy, which has been shown to predict better comprehension of healthrelated statistics. 32 
Method

Participants
Participants were 239 undergraduate Polish-speaking students (199 women) at 3 branch campuses of SWPS University in age ranging from 19 to 51 years (M = 26.76, SD = 8.68). Participants received course credits for participation. Five participants were excluded from the following analyses based on their response time data. 1 
Materials and Procedure
Stimuli were a set of 67 neoplasm and 43 circulatory system nosological entities taken from the ICD-10. 6 Two random sets of stimuli were created (55 diseases each). 2 Average CFRs were comparable between sets, BF 01 = 4.73, as were mean MRs, BF 01 = 4.1.
Each participant completed 2 experimental blocks ( Figure 1 ) containing the same set of stimuli: 1) affective evaluations and 2) rate evaluations, in 165 and 110 trials, respectively. The order of blocks was counterbalanced across participants. In the affective evaluations block, participants rated each nosological entity using three 10-point scales: 1) How intense a fear does the disease induce in you? (1 = no fear at all, 10 = very intense fear), 2) How intense a disgust does the disease induce in you? (1 = no disgust at all, 10 = very intense disgust), 3) How typical is the disease for its category-neoplasms/diseases of the circulatory system? (1 = not typical at all, 10 = very typical). The full nosological entity with its ICD-10 6 code was always presented on the screen used (e.g., C37 malignant neoplasm of thymus). Each disease was rated 3 times, with the rating scales for different diseases being presented sequentially and in randomized order.
In the rate evaluations block, participants estimated 2 objective numbers regarding the given disease: number of patients and number of deaths. Specifically, participants were asked 2 questions: 1) How many people in Poland suffered from the disease between 2003 and 2012? and 2) How many people in Poland died of the disease between 2003 and 2012? As in the affective evaluations block, a full nosological entity with its ICD-10 6 code was presented on the screen, with questions displayed randomly within a disease and all diseases presented in a random order for each participant. Participants were reminded at the beginning of the block that the Polish population is about 38 million people. At the end of the procedure, participants were asked if they were familiar with WHO mortality and morbidity statistics and completed the Berlin Numeracy Test in a computerized, adaptive version. 33 
Data Preparation
First, we obtained MRs by extracting values of the inpatients per 1000 population statistic from the European Hospital Morbidity Database. 5 Mortality rates were obtained by extracting crude death rate per 100,000 statistics from the European Detailed Mortality Database. 4 Both data sets were specific to the Polish population of males and females of all ages and covered the period from 2003 to 2012. We averaged both statistics across 10 years 3 and calculated CFRs by dividing mortality rates by the corresponding MRs. Relative CFRs and relative MRs were then determined using Eq. (1).
Next, for data collected in the rate evaluations block, participants' raw estimates of morbidity and mortality rates were transformed into probabilities. Then, we calculated subjective CFRs by dividing subjective mortality rates by subjective MRs. 4 Finally, we merged relative CFRs, MRs, and the other disease characteristics with the data collected in the study and created aggregated and raw data sets (i.e., data sets containing 55 rows per participants). Henceforth, participants' estimates are labeled subjective CFR and MR and, together with typicality and disgust ratings, are referred to as subjective predictors. Relative objective CFRs and MRs will be labeled CFRs and MRs, respectively, and, together with disease category (i.e., neoplasms v. circulatory diseases), are labeled objective predictors. 
Analyses and Modeling Approach
To investigate the relationships between variables in the aggregated data set, we used Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficient. Because of several drawbacks associated with frequentist P values, 34 we employed Bayesian hypothesis testing to assess the credibility of estimated coefficients in the light of the data. We used JASP 35 to obtain Bayes Factors in favor of the alternative hypothesis that a correlation existed (BF 10 ). 36 The BF 10 statistic represents the relative plausibility of the data under H 1 compared with H 0 . For example, BF 10 = 10 means that data are 10 times more probable under hypothesis H 1 than under the null hypothesis (H 0 ). All correlation analyses were performed with uniform prior distributions asserting every value of r (i.e., the population-level correlation coefficient) between 21 and +1 as being equally plausible a priori.
We used Bayesian multilevel linear modeling 37 on the raw data set to test the relationship between CFRs and disease-level fear ratings while controlling for withinparticipant relationships between subjective variables. In our model, a single data point represents a rating i (i.e., unit-level observation), which corresponds to a rating of subject j for disease k. With J participants, K diseases, and n data points, where n = J Á K and y = (y 1 ,., y i , ., y n ), the model can be represented as
where (considering fear ratings as the dependent variable for this example)
The first line represents unit-level linear regression, with an individual (i.e., separate for each participant) constant term b 0 j , and typicality and disgust ratings, and subjective CFR and MR as predictors, each with a participant-specific regression coefficient b j . The a k term is a column vector of disease-level fear ratings (i.e., mean fear rating for each disease) and is given its own linear model in line 3. The y i term is a unitlevel error term assumed to follow a normal distribution with a zero mean and a standard deviation s y estimated from the data: Finally, in the third line, a disease-level linear model is specified, with disease categories (i.e., neoplasms v. circulatory diseases) coded -0.5 and 0.5, respectively; CFR, MR, and experimental set (also coded -0.5 and 0.5); and name length (i.e., the number of characters in the diagnostic entity) as predictors of disease-level fear ratings, with consecutive g coefficients representing the regression coefficients of these predictors. The a k term is a disease-level error term assumed to follow a normal distribution with a zero mean and a standard deviation s a estimated from the data:
An assumption of the model expressed in Eq. (2) is that the associations between subjective predictors and the dependent variable have unique values for each participant. Simultaneously, category, CFR, and MR are implemented in a disease-level regression, allowing testing of the relationships between the objective predictors and mean fear ratings while controlling for unit-level relationships between subjective variables.
In the Bayesian framework, estimates are initially represented in terms of prior distributions, which are then updated to posterior distributions in the light of data. The posterior distributions represent uncertainty in the estimates and can be summarized by statistics such as the mode and 95% highest density intervals (HDIs). 38 Assuming the fitted model is the mechanism that generated the data, there is a 0.95 probability that an HDI includes a parameter's ''true'' value. Estimates provided in the text are modes of posterior distributions with 95% HDIs in square brackets. An estimate is said to be statistically credible when its HDI does not include zero. The posterior distributions of the model's parameters were estimated via Gibbs sampling with JAGS 39 in the R statistical environment 40 using the R2jags package 41 (see the online Appendix A for details about priors and sampling from posterior distributions).
Results
Correlation coefficients for the aggregated data are presented in Table 1 (see the online Appendix B for more details). In line with our predictions, we found a positive moderate relationship between CFR and fear. In addition, fear ratings correlated weakly with objective MR and moderately with subjective MR and CFR, but the strongest relationship was observed with typicality ratings. Interestingly, subjective CFR also correlated strongly with objective CFR but not with objective MR, whereas subjective MR did correlate strongly with objective MR. Finally, typicality ratings strongly correlated with objective MR and very strongly with subjective MR. Relationships with disgust ratings were not credible, apart from a weak association with subjective MR, which also had relatively little support in the data compared with other BF 10 values.
The Bayes factors for most credible relationships indicated that the evidence for the hypothesis assuming associations was extreme, since most of the BF 10 values were greater than 150. 42 These results indicate that fear and typicality ratings were associated with different objective predictors to differing degrees and that they were also substantially related to each other. Thus, the next section reports a more detailed investigation using raw data and incorporating more control of unit-level relationships between subjective predictors.
Determinants of Fear Ratings
We used Eq. (2) with fear ratings as the dependent variable to investigate relationships between disease-level fear ratings and objective predictors while controlling for unit-level associations among subjective predictors, including subjective CFR and MR ( Figure 2 ). All predictors were z-scaled (using their respective global means and standard deviations), but fear ratings were entered on their original scale. Thus, regression coefficients represent the predicted change in fear rating for a 1-standard deviation increase in a predictor.
At the disease level, both objective CFR, Means with standard deviations are provided on the diagonal. For each relationship, from the top, the point estimate of the Pearson correlation coefficient is given, in the middle are 95% HDIs, and on the bottom are the corresponding BF 10 s. An absolute value of the correlation coefficient in the range from 0.1 to \0.3 indicates a weak association, from 0.3 to \0.5 a moderate association, from 0.5 to \0.7 a strong association, and r ! 0.7 indicates a very strong association. CFR, case fatality rate; MR, morbidity rate.
Next, we investigated the effect of objective predictors as within-participant slopes and the influence of numeracy, age, sex, and familiarity with WHO statistics (only 7 of 234 participants declared familiarity with these statistics) on these effects (online Appendix C). We found that only the effect of category (i.e., the rating of neoplasms as more frightening than circulatory diseases) depended on values of the control measures. First, in the small group of participants familiar with WHO statistics, the category effect was considerably stronger, t . Importantly, even after controlling for full withinparticipants variability of the objective predictors' effects, age, sex, WHO statistics knowledge, and numeracy, the group-level relationships for objective CFR, MR, and category followed the same qualitative pattern as in Figure 2 (see Figure C1 ). Note that in terms of the deviance information criterion (DIC), the model with all the objective predictors treated as within-participant effects and with control of individual-level predictors fitted the data considerably better than the Eq. (2) model (DIC Eq.2 = 50844 v. DIC Eq.B1 = 50451).
Using Eq. (2), we also investigated typicality ratings as a dependent variable to test whether relationships 
Discussion
We have shown that CFRs are positively associated with fear ratings of neoplasms and circulatory diseases, even when this information is not explicitly provided to participants. This association was credible even when controlling for diagnostic entity categories, MR, disgust, and typicality ratings as well as subjective CFR and MR estimates. Also, neoplasms were rated as more frightening than circulatory diseases but interestingly only among women.
Emotions and Probabilities: Should We Trust Our Fears?
When evaluating risky prospects, people behave as if they transform objective probabilities into subjective representations, which results in overweighting of small and underweighting of medium and high probabilities. 43 When prospects induce strong negative emotions, the overweighting is more pronounced, indicating low sensitivity to probability changes and high pessimism. Such a weighting function shape may suggest usage of noncompensatory heuristics such as minimax and reduced attention to probabilities compared with choices in less emotional contexts. 44, 45 Incidental influences such as negative mood 46, 47 and unrelated emotions 48 also result in slightly more distorted probability processing. Thus, it seems that when processing prospects with objective probabilities explicitly stated, negative emotions may lead to suboptimal choices.
Our findings indicate that the objective CFR of a disease is related to the intensity of fear associated with the disease. This suggests that initial affective reactions toward risky events may reflect objective levels of risk and thus be informative to some extent. We believe that if the conditions for skilled intuition development are met, such fears can be trusted.
Skilled Intuition
According to decision by sampling theory, 3 the subjective value (e.g., fear rating) of any attribute (e.g., a disease) is given by its relative ranking in a sample of attributes. The mechanism behind the development of this association may resemble that required for the development of skilled intuition 49 : the ability to make fast, accurate judgments and decisions in a complex environment, based only on a hunch or ''gut feeling.'' Two conditions are required for such an intuition to develop: 1) cues provided from the environment must be valid and 2) opportunities to learn must occur. In the context of our study, the cues are information from family, friends, and the media about people having various diseases. The opportunity to learn occurs naturally when one is informed about the outcome of the disease. This feedback will usually be associated with an emotional reaction: negative in the case of death and positive in the case of recovery.
Intuition is part of a larger, mostly unconscious system of cognition characterized by fast, parallel information processing that operates mostly on emotions, associations, schemas, and the implicit acquisition of patterns and statistics 50, 51 (System 1). The complementary System 2 engages deliberate and controlled mental processes. Consequently, it is believed to be slow, sequential, analytic, and closely interconnected with central working memory. 51, 52 In the study, we asked participants to estimate the prevalence of diseases and numbers of deaths. Since estimation is rather a conscious and deliberate process, the task presumably engaged system 2. Interestingly, subjective CFR was a weaker predictor of fear ratings than objective CFR at both group and individual levels. Since almost all participants were unfamiliar with WHO statistics, this suggests that fear reactions toward disease may arise as intuitive, experiencebased responses. In the absence of knowledge, System 2 seems worse than System 1 at predicting self-declared emotional intensity, and the availability heuristic may be of particular importance in understanding this result. The most fatal diseases are publicized frequently (e.g., through the media or nationwide prevention programs), making their retrieval from memory much easier than other diseases. Consequently, such diseases and deaths from them might be judged as more frequent and, as a consequence, more frightening.
Potential Practical Implications
Most work seeking to improve risk communication focuses on designing decision aids that facilitate the process of identifying or understanding particular information presented in a descriptive format. 53, 54 However, decisions from experience, a relatively new field in judgment and decision making, sheds new light on problems involving uncertainty and choice. Instead of processing descriptive information about probabilities in decision problems, participants have an opportunity to explore outcome distributions by sampling outcomes from them and to build an experienced-based representation of subjective probabilities. 15 Hogarth and Soyer 55 showed that such ''simulated experience'' led to more accurate risk perceptions than a descriptive format. Our results suggest that the intensity of a fear response for a disease is related to its CFR, which in turn is a proxy of how often people may encounter information about death from the disease. This said, people are unlikely to have accurate representations of distributions of mortality and morbidity rates. Thus, some people's reactions will be too strong or too weak, and consequently, their level of motivation to avoid developing a given disease may be inadequate. We believe that communicating risk using an experience format 55, 56 can help develop an adequate gist or intuition about the level of risk at hand.
Limitations
The study has 2 major limitations. First, the limited number of diagnostic entities and exclusion of nonfatal diseases and categories limit the generalizability of the observed effects. Further investigations could include nonfatal diseases or other categories such as infectious diseases. Also, additional control of the technicality of disease names and personal experience of each disease could be included, along with more precise measurement of affective responses such as autonomic nervous system measures (e.g., electrodermal response).
Second, our sample consisted mostly of young adults, women were overrepresented, and participants received course credits, which might have biased the sample. However, the fact that we found evidence for our hypothesis in this sample may be considered advantageous, since older adults should be more concerned with diseases than younger adults. Nevertheless, replication with a more representative nonstudent sample could provide important additional support for our results.
Conclusions
We have presented initial evidence that implicit acquisition of CFRs through everyday experience may shape the intensity of fear reactions to diseases. Our results indicate that, to some extent, people may use the intensity of their emotions as an indicator of risk level, especially when conditions for the development of skilled intuition have been met. In other cases, fear reactions could be fine-tuned using an experience-based format of information presentation. We believe that further studies investigating how real-world experience maps onto people's emotional reactions could be beneficial for understanding how exactly this phenomenon might be used to improve risk communication.
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Notes
1. Four participants were not fully engaged in the study as indicated by, for example, the 20-minute response time to a single rating question. The fifth participant had a median response time of 0.26 seconds (the median response time in the full sample was 3.8 seconds). 2. A final set of 110 nosological entities was taken from an initial set of 152 diseases for which statistical data were available. Forty-two items were excluded because of their vague and noninformative names (e.g., ''Other malignant neoplasms of skin''). 3. This resulted in a reduction from 165 to 152 nosological entities, as 13 diseases did not cause death in the relevant time period. 4. In 7.7% of cases, subjective estimates of mortality rates exceeded subjective estimates of morbidity rates. At the same time, at least 1 such case appeared in the data for 189 participants (out of a total of 234). We decided to define the subjective morbidity rate as the sum of the number of people getting a disease and the number of people who died, to avoid loss of data in cases in which a subjective MR was lower than a subjective mortality rate.
